Vladimir putin, Russia’s president, has declared the liberal idea “obsolete”. It will not surprise you to learn that we disagree. Not just because he told the Financial Times that liberalism was all about immigration, multiculturalism and gender politics—a travesty—but also because he picked the wrong target. The idea most under threat in the West is conservatism. And you do not have to be a conservative to find that deeply troubling.
In two-party systems, like the United States and (broadly) Britain, the right is in power, but only by jettisoning the values that used to define it. In countries with many parties the centre-right is being eroded, as in Germany and Spain, or eviscerated, as in France and Italy. And in other places, like Hungary, with a shorter democratic tradition, the right has gone straight to populism without even trying conservatism.
Conservatism is not so much a philosophy as a disposition. The philosopher Michael Oakeshott put it best: “To be conservative…is to prefer the familiar to the unknown, to prefer the tried to the untried, fact to mystery, the actual to the possible, the limited to the unbounded, the near to the distant.” Like classical liberalism, conservatism is a child of the Enlightenment. Liberals say that social order emerges spontaneously from individuals acting freely, but conservatives believe social order comes first, creating the conditions for freedom. It looks to the authority of family, church, tradition and local associations to control change, and slow it down. You sweep away institutions at your peril. Yet just such a demolition is happening to conservatism itself—and it is coming from the right.
The new right is not an evolution of conservatism, but a repudiation of it. The usurpers are aggrieved and discontent. They are pessimists and reactionaries. They look at the world and see what President Donald Trump once called “carnage”.
Consider how they are smashing one conservative tradition after another. Conservatism is pragmatic, but the new right is zealous, ideological and cavalier with the truth. Australia suffers droughts and reef-bleaching seas, but the right has just won an election there under a party whose leader addressed parliament holding a lump of coal like a holy relic. In Italy Matteo Salvini, leader of the Northern League, has boosted the anti-vaxxer movement. For Mr Trump “facts” are just devices to puff up his image or slogans designed to stir up outrage and tribal loyalties.
Conservatives are cautious about change, but the right now airily contemplates revolution. Alternative for Germany has flirted with a referendum on membership of the euro. Were Mr Trump to carry out his threats to leave nato (see “The World If” in this issue), it would up-end the balance of power. A no-deal Brexit would be a leap into the unknown, but Tories yearn for it, even if it destroys the union with Scotland and Northern Ireland.
Conservatives believe in character, because politics is about judgment as well as reason. They are suspicious of charisma and personality cults. In America plenty of Republicans who know better have fallen in with Mr Trump even though he has been credibly accused by 16 different women of sexual misconduct. Brazilians have elected Jair Bolsonaro, who fondly recalls the days of military rule. The charismatic Boris Johnson is favourite to be Britain’s next prime minister, despite being mistrusted by mps, because he is deemed to be the “Heineken Tory” who will, like the beer, refresh the parts other conservatives cannot reach.
Conservatives respect business and are prudent stewards of the economy, because prosperity underpins everything. Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Urban, paints himself as a low-tax economic conservative, but undermines the rule of law on which businesses depend. Mr Trump is a wager of trade wars. Over 60% of Tory members are willing to inflict “serious damage” on the economy to secure Brexit. In Italy the League is spooking markets by toying with issuing government paper that would act as a parallel currency to the euro. In Poland Law and Justice has splashed out on a welfare bonanza. In France, in the campaign for the European Parliament elections, the rump Republican Party made more of a splash about Europe’s “Judeo-Christian roots” than prudent economic management.
Last, the right is changing what it means to belong. In Hungary and Poland the right exults in blood-and-soil nationalism, which excludes and discriminates. Vox, a new force in Spain, harks back to the Reconquista, when Christians kicked out the Muslims. An angry, reactionary nationalism kindles suspicion, hatred and division. It is the antithesis of the conservative insight that belonging to the nation, a church and the local community can unite people and motivate them to act in the common good.
Conservatism has been radicalised for several reasons. One is the decline of what Edmund Burke called the “little platoons” that it relied on, such as religion, unions and the family. Another is that the old parties on both right and left were discredited by the financial crisis, austerity and the long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Outside the cities, people feel as if they are sneered at by greedy, self-serving urban sophisticates. A few have been wound up by the xenophobia of political entrepreneurs. The collapse of the Soviet Union, some believe, loosened the glue uniting a coalition of foreign-policy hawks, libertarians and cultural and pro-business conservatives. None of these trends will be easy to reverse.
The right stuff
That does not mean everything is going the way of parties of the new right. In Britain and America, at least, demography is against them. Their voters are white and relatively old. Universities are a right-wing-free zone. A survey by Pew last year found that 59% of American millennial voters were Democratic or leaned Democratic; the corresponding share of Republicans was only 32%. Among the “silent generation”, born in 1928-45, Democrats scored 43% and Republicans 52%. It is not clear enough young people will drift to the right as they age to fill the gap.
But the new right is clearly winning its fight against Enlightenment conservatism. For classical liberals, like this newspaper, that is a source of regret. Conservatives and liberals disagree about many things, such as drugs and sexual freedom. But they are more often allies. Both reject the Utopian impulse to find a government solution for every wrong. Both resist state planning and high taxes. The conservative inclination to police morals is offset by an impulse to guard free speech and to promote freedom and democracy around the world. Indeed conservatives and liberals often bring out the best in each other. Conservatism tempers liberal zeal; liberals puncture conservative complacency.
The new right is, by contrast, implacably hostile towards classical liberals. The risk is that moderates will be squeezed out as right and left inflame politics and provoke each other to move to the extremes. Voters may be left without a choice. Recoiling against Mr Trump, Democrats have moved further to the left on immigration than the country at large. The British, with two big parties, may have to pick between Jeremy Corbyn, Labour’s hard-left leader, and a radicalised Tory party under Mr Johnson. Even if you can vote for the centre, as with Emmanuel Macron in France, one party will win repeatedly by default—which, in the long run, is unhealthy for democracy.
At its best conservatism can be a steadying influence. It is reasonable and wise; it values competence; it is not in a hurry. Those days are over. Today’s right is on fire and it is dangerous. ◼
China's President Xi Jinping has called for the country's universities to become ideological "strongholds" of the Communist Party, the latest move in a crackdown on academic freedom.
The universities must "serve the rule of the Chinese Communist Party" and "promote socialism", Mr Xi said.
They must also integrate "ideological work" throughout the entire process of education, he said.
Beijing has cracked down on free speech since Mr Xi became leader in 2012.
Chinese authorities have been accused of detaining and jailing human rights activists, lawyers, and journalists.
Although no new legislation has been introduced, the leader's pronouncements direct policy within the party and other institutions.
Mr Xi now appears to be exerting greater control over educational institutions, raising fears over a further curtailing of academic freedoms.
According to state news agency Xinhua, Mr Xi told a party meeting on ideology in education that universities are "under the leadership of the Communist Party, and are socialist colleges with Chinese characteristics, so higher education must be guided by Marxism".
He said: "Adherence to the Party's leadership is essential to the development of higher education in the country", adding that China should "build universities into strongholds that adhere to Party leadership".
China has long enforced political education classes at universities, but a number of professors complained earlier this year that students were being "brainwashed by Western theories".
The state-run People's Daily newspaper printed Mr Xi's speech in full on its front-page on Friday, alongside a front-page editorial urging party members to direct university ideology.
China passed a controversial internet security bill in November that banned internet users from publishing anything that damages "national honour", "disturbs economic or social order" or is aimed at "overthrowing the socialist system".
More and more money is being spent on higher education. Too little is known about whether it is worth it
“AFTER God had carried us safe to New England, and we had builded our
houses, provided necessaries for our livelihood, reared convenient
places for God’s worship and settled Civil Government, one of the next
things we longed for and looked for was to advance learning and
perpetuate it to posterity.” So ran the first university fundraising
brochure, sent from Harvard College to England in 1643 to drum up cash.
America’s early and lasting enthusiasm for higher education has given
it the biggest and best-funded system in the world. Hardly surprising,
then, that other countries are emulating its model as they send ever
more of their school-leavers to get a university education. But, as our
special report argues, just as America’s system is spreading, there are
growing concerns about whether it is really worth the vast sums spent on
it.
The American way
The modern research university, a marriage of the Oxbridge college
and the German research institute, was invented in America, and has
become the gold standard for the world. Mass higher education started in
America in the 19th century, spread to Europe and East Asia in the 20th
and is now happening pretty much everywhere except sub-Saharan Africa.
The global tertiary-enrolment ratio—the share of the student-age
population at university—went up from 14% to 32% in the two decades to
2012; in that time, the number of countries with a ratio of more than
half rose from five to 54. University enrolment is growing faster even
than demand for that ultimate consumer good, the car. The hunger for
degrees is understandable: these days they are a requirement for a
decent job and an entry ticket to the middle class.
There are, broadly, two ways of satisfying this huge demand. One is
the continental European approach of state funding and provision, in
which most institutions have equal resources and status. The second is
the more market-based American model, of mixed private-public funding
and provision, with brilliant, well-funded institutions at the top and
poorer ones at the bottom.
The world is moving in the American direction. More universities in
more countries are charging students tuition fees. And as politicians
realise that the “knowledge economy” requires top-flight research,
public resources are being focused on a few privileged institutions and
the competition to create world-class universities is intensifying.
In some ways, that is excellent. The best universities are
responsible for many of the discoveries that have made the world a
safer, richer and more interesting place. But costs are rising. OECD
countries spend 1.6% of GDP on higher education, compared with 1.3% in
2000. If the American model continues to spread, that share will rise
further. America spends 2.7% of its GDP on higher education.
If America were getting its money’s worth from higher education, that
would be fine. On the research side, it probably is. In 2014, 19 of the
20 universities in the world that produced the most highly cited
research papers were American. But on the educational side, the picture
is less clear. American graduates score poorly in international numeracy
and literacy rankings, and are slipping. In a recent study of academic
achievement, 45% of American students made no gains in their first two
years of university. Meanwhile, tuition fees have nearly doubled, in
real terms, in 20 years. Student debt, at nearly $1.2 trillion, has
surpassed credit-card debt and car loans.
None of this means that going to university is a bad investment for a
student. A bachelor’s degree in America still yields, on average, a 15%
return. But it is less clear whether the growing investment in tertiary
education makes sense for society as a whole. If graduates earn more
than non-graduates because their studies have made them more productive,
then university education will boost economic growth and society should
want more of it. Yet poor student scores suggest otherwise. So, too,
does the testimony of employers. A recent study of recruitment by
professional-services firms found that they took graduates from the most
prestigious universities not because of what the candidates might have
learned but because of those institutions’ tough selection procedures.
In short, students could be paying vast sums merely to go through a very
elaborate sorting mechanism.
If America’s universities are indeed poor value for money, why might
that be? The main reason is that the market for higher education, like
that for health care, does not work well. The government rewards
universities for research, so that is what professors concentrate on.
Students are looking for a degree from an institution that will impress
employers; employers are interested primarily in the selectivity of the
institution a candidate has attended. Since the value of a degree from a
selective institution depends on its scarcity, good universities have
little incentive to produce more graduates. And, in the absence of a
clear measure of educational output, price becomes a proxy for quality.
By charging more, good universities gain both revenue and prestige.
What’s it worth?
More information would make the higher-education market work better.
Common tests, which students would sit alongside their final exams,
could provide a comparable measure of universities’ educational
performance. Students would have a better idea of what was taught well
where, and employers of how much job candidates had learned. Resources
would flow towards universities that were providing value for money and
away from those that were not. Institutions would have an incentive to
improve teaching and use technology to cut costs. Online courses, which
have so far failed to realise their promise of revolutionising higher
education, would begin to make a bigger impact. The government would
have a better idea of whether society should be investing more or less
in higher education.
Sceptics argue that university education is too complex to be
measured in this way. Certainly, testing 22-year-olds is harder than
testing 12-year-olds. Yet many disciplines contain a core of material
that all graduates in that subject should know. More generally,
universities should be able to show that they have taught their students
to think critically.
Some governments and institutions are trying to shed light on
educational outcomes. A few American state-university systems already
administer a common test to graduates. Testing is spreading in Latin
America. Most important, the OECD, whose PISA assessments of secondary
education gave governments a jolt, is also having a go. It wants to test
subject-knowledge and reasoning ability, starting with economics and
engineering, and marking institutions as well as countries. Asian
governments are keen, partly because they believe that a measure of the
quality of their universities will help them in the market for
international students; rich countries, which have more to lose and less
to gain, are not. Without funding and participation from them, the
effort will remain grounded.
Governments need to get behind these efforts. America’s market-based
system of well-funded, highly differentiated universities can be of huge
benefit to society if students learn the right stuff. If not, a great
deal of money will be wasted.