How to break the deadlock in Berlin
Political uncertainty is bad for Germany and Europe. Germans should vote again
IN THE churn of European politics, with America seemingly pulling out and Russia pushing in, many hoped that Germany would rise up. They looked to Angela Merkel, its chancellor, to resist populism. They dreamed that the Franco-German partnership, energised by France’s new president, Emmanuel Macron, could strengthen the enfeebled European Union—just as soon, of course, as Mrs Merkel got her fourth poll victory out of the way. German voters thought otherwise.
In the election on September 24th they punished Mrs Merkel’s grand coalition of Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Social Democrats (SPD) . These “GroKo” parties collectively lost almost 14% of the vote, most of that going to right-of-centre parties, including the populist Alternative for Germany. The chancellor tried to negotiate a three-way coalition of her CDU/CSU, the revived pro-business Free Democrats (FDP) and the Greens. Though this would have had many advantages, bargaining with both left and right was always going to be tricky, and the talks broke down on November 19th, when the FDP walked out (see article).
Mrs Merkel is gravely weakened. She has consistently been reluctant to take on a bigger role in the world. Today she faces an altogether different problem—of political fragmentation and deadlock—that is familiar to other countries, but not to post-war Germany. The protracted uncertainty that is now likely will be bad for Mrs Merkel, for Germany and for Europe.
Mrs Merkel faces three options, none of them palatable. The first is to form a minority government either with the FDP, or with the Greens (or, just possibly, alone). Germany’s constitution (and consensual traditions) would give such a government some protection from no-confidence votes. Yet, though other countries have minority governments, modern Germany has no federal experience of them. Mrs Merkel herself batted away the idea that such a beast could give Germany the stable government it needs. The FDP leader, Christian Lindner, says he is not interested either. A minority government is highly improbable—unless a deal with the Greens gives Mrs Merkel the option of relying on case-by-case support from the SPD.
More likely, therefore, is the option of reviving the GroKo with the SPD. It has governed Germany pretty well since 2013. The SPD supports strengthening the euro zone, for instance by giving more powers to its European Stability Mechanism, so a grand coalition could work closely with Mr Macron.
Although this may be Mrs Merkel’s preferred option, it too has problems. The SPD’s leader, Martin Schulz, has ruled the GroKo out, though he is now under pressure from some in his party, including Germany’s president, to change his mind. Being in government with Mrs Merkel hurt the SPD, pushing its share of the vote down to its lowest-ever level. The party needs a stint in opposition to revive itself. Most of all, a GroKo might be seen by Germans as reheating the stale dish that they rejected, adding yet again to the appeal of the political extremes.
That leaves a new election, the option Mrs Merkel should pursue. True, there are risks. A vote cannot happen soon: Germany’s constitution, mindful of the 20 governments and nine elections in the 14 Weimar years, deliberately makes it hard to call one early. Add the time needed for more coalition-building, and Germany—and the EU—could be without a new government in Berlin until May or June. There is no guarantee that the result, in the messy seven-party political environment of today’s Germany, will be any more clear-cut than the last.
In the election on September 24th they punished Mrs Merkel’s grand coalition of Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Social Democrats (SPD) . These “GroKo” parties collectively lost almost 14% of the vote, most of that going to right-of-centre parties, including the populist Alternative for Germany. The chancellor tried to negotiate a three-way coalition of her CDU/CSU, the revived pro-business Free Democrats (FDP) and the Greens. Though this would have had many advantages, bargaining with both left and right was always going to be tricky, and the talks broke down on November 19th, when the FDP walked out (see article).
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Mrs Merkel faces three options, none of them palatable. The first is to form a minority government either with the FDP, or with the Greens (or, just possibly, alone). Germany’s constitution (and consensual traditions) would give such a government some protection from no-confidence votes. Yet, though other countries have minority governments, modern Germany has no federal experience of them. Mrs Merkel herself batted away the idea that such a beast could give Germany the stable government it needs. The FDP leader, Christian Lindner, says he is not interested either. A minority government is highly improbable—unless a deal with the Greens gives Mrs Merkel the option of relying on case-by-case support from the SPD.
More likely, therefore, is the option of reviving the GroKo with the SPD. It has governed Germany pretty well since 2013. The SPD supports strengthening the euro zone, for instance by giving more powers to its European Stability Mechanism, so a grand coalition could work closely with Mr Macron.
Although this may be Mrs Merkel’s preferred option, it too has problems. The SPD’s leader, Martin Schulz, has ruled the GroKo out, though he is now under pressure from some in his party, including Germany’s president, to change his mind. Being in government with Mrs Merkel hurt the SPD, pushing its share of the vote down to its lowest-ever level. The party needs a stint in opposition to revive itself. Most of all, a GroKo might be seen by Germans as reheating the stale dish that they rejected, adding yet again to the appeal of the political extremes.
That leaves a new election, the option Mrs Merkel should pursue. True, there are risks. A vote cannot happen soon: Germany’s constitution, mindful of the 20 governments and nine elections in the 14 Weimar years, deliberately makes it hard to call one early. Add the time needed for more coalition-building, and Germany—and the EU—could be without a new government in Berlin until May or June. There is no guarantee that the result, in the messy seven-party political environment of today’s Germany, will be any more clear-cut than the last.
Vote, vote, vote
An election would, however, offer the advantage of allowing debate over important issues, such as the future of the European project, that the parties avoided in the previous campaign. Rich and stable, Germany need not fear repeated elections. But none of this looks good for Mrs Merkel. She says she would run again if there were another vote, and she is unlikely to face a leadership challenge just now. But a poor election result, followed by the failure of the coalition talks, has given her an air of precariousness. Whatever option she chooses, she is about to enter the final act of her political career.
