Syria--Towards the endgame

Syria--Towards the endgame

July 19th, 21:58

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by  Nasra Ismail and Biodun Iginla, BBC News and The Economist

The world should start preparing for what comes after Syria’s President Bashar Assad

Jul 21st 2012 | from the print edition

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IN EVERY revolution, there is a moment when the tide turns against the regime. In Egypt it came on January 28th last year, when protesters occupied Tahrir Square and torched the ruling-party headquarters. In Libya it happened on August 20th last year, when people in Tripoli rose against Qaddafi. In Syria it may have happened on July 18th, when a bomb struck at the heart of Syria’s military command.
If the attack shifts the balance of power decisively against President Bashar Assad, that is greatly to be welcomed. But a year or so after their revolutions, both Egypt and Libya remain unstable; and Syria, which borders Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, is an exceptionally complex and pivotal part of the Middle East. Those who wish Syrians well now need to focus not just on how to bring about Mr Assad’s swift fall from power, but also on how to spare the post-Assad Syria from murder and chaos and how to prevent violence from spreading across a combustible region.

In this section

• »Towards the endgame
• The great slowdown
• Rewards of the rings
• The empty Kremlin
• Out of shape

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The bombing of the national security headquarters in Damascus is likely to weaken the regime in a number of ways (see article). It wounded many and killed the defence minister and a former military chief. Worse still for the president was the death of Assef Shawkat, his brother-in-law and one of the regime’s most powerful figures. Mr Assad rapidly filled their positions, but in a country governed by a clique held together by personal loyalty, the dead men will not easily be replaced.
That the bombing seems to have been an inside job, requiring intelligence and access deep inside the regime, will also damage the command structure of the armed forces and the security services. The loyalty of the army—in which the officers are largely from Mr Assad’s Alawite sect and the ranks are mostly Sunni—was anyway one of the regime’s weaknesses. A blast from a huge bomb somehow smuggled into the inner sanctum will sow mistrust and suspicion at all levels.
The attack is just the latest blow to Mr Assad: all over the country, turmoil is growing. The rate of killing is now roughly ten times greater than in Afghanistan. Swathes of the west and north-west have become no-go areas for government forces, who are being killed in greater numbers than even two months ago. The pace of defections is increasing: a score of generals have deserted.
Especially in the borderlands, disaffection and dissent are palpable. Homs and Hama, the country’s third- and fourth-biggest cities, are hostile to Mr Assad. Damascus and Aleppo, the two main cities, have been less torrid because quite a lot of their people have taken the view that Mr Assad is a better guarantor of stability than the alternative. Now that rebel fighters have entered the city, that no longer looks clear.
The attack will also be changing calculations abroad. For the past few months, diplomacy has focused on a plan, overseen by Kofi Annan, a former UN secretary-general, to negotiate an effective ceasefire under a team of monitors and to set up an interim unity government. But over the past few weeks the Annan plan, along with many thousands of Syrians, has died. The rebels, who can now smell victory, will not agree to a ceasefire. The monitors’ activities have been suspended because of the fighting. The country is ravaged by civil war, so there is no prospect of putting together a unity government. After this week’s bomb the danger is that a desperate Mr Assad will resort to ever more extreme tactics—flattening whole districts in Damascus with heavy artillery, say, or seeking to provoke a regional war, or even murdering his own people with chemical weapons.
The enormity of that prospect makes it worth trying yet again to persuade Mr Assad to face up to the hopelessness of his position and to accept that flight from Syria is now his best option. The threat of international justice—especially warnings about his pariah status if he uses chemical weapons—might just have some force. But only Russia has much influence over him. The desire to protect an old ally, fear of its own restive Muslims and hostility to Western calls for regime change have led Russia to shelter Mr Assad’s regime from diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions.
As it seems ever-likelier that Mr Assad will go, so the chances that Russia will abandon him in return for a role in a post-Assad Syria grow. But in the absence of a decisive diplomatic shift in the right direction, Western governments should try to give the military effort against Mr Assad a further push. The swiftest way of doing that would be to give aid—such as money and communications gear—to the main rebel force, the Free Syrian Army. It is already getting arms and cash from Qatar and Saudi Arabia with Turkish co-operation, but it needs more help; for, despite its recent setbacks, Mr Assad’s regime is heavily armed with the best Russian kit.
The FSA is no band of angels. Some of its weapons will doubtless fall into the wrong hands, possibly including groups of jihadists. Flooding Syria with arms will make the country harder to govern once Mr Assad has gone. But backing the FSA is probably the quickest way to prise Mr Assad from power.
What comes after
Mr Assad may hang on for months, or the bombing may tip the regime into a swift decline. Either way, now is the time to start preparing for the day when Syria is at last rid of him.
Syria after Mr Assad will be a danger to its own people and its neighbours. Sectarian bloodletting is one risk, loose chemical weapons another, tides of refugees a third. Syria could become the focus of rivalry between Iran, Turkey and the Arab world. Violence could suck in Israel or spill over into Lebanon.
The world cannot eliminate these dangers, but it can mitigate them. Money and planning are essential to help found a new government. Regional diplomacy, with Turkey and the Arab League to the fore, will be needed to steady nerves. Peace-keepers and monitors may have a part. This calls above all for presidential diplomacy from America. In election season Barack Obama’s thoughts may be elsewhere; but this dangerous place needs some attention.

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